Op-ed in Swedish Expressen, October 12, 2021 (and in Norwegian Verdens Gang)
What is antisemitism?
However we choose to define the term antisemitism, the signs are ominous; the kind of hateful and conspiratorial beliefs about "Jews" that became impossible to air in public after the Holocaust are not impossible anymore. In the brave new world of internet, blatantly antisemitic ideas and stereotypes are seeping right into our living rooms and from there onto our streets. Today, there is hardly a conspiracy theory worthy of the name that does not have antisemitic undertones. Consequently, antisemitically inspired attacks and acts of violence against Jews and Jewish institutions have become increasingly common. Unmistakably antisemitic ideas and beliefs now thrive openly on the extreme right and the extreme left, in Islamist and right-wing Christian circles, in countries where there are Jews and in countries where there are hardly any.
Against this background, it is of course highly commendable that the Swedish government has invited leaders from around the world to an international forum in Malmö to discuss the issue of how to combat antisemitism. There is also no doubt about Swedish prime minister Stefan Löfven's personal commitment to the issue.
"Wherever we see antisemitism expressed, we must uncompromisingly expose, confront and combat it," he has wisely said.
He has also said that Sweden has committed itself to the definition of antisemitism established by something called IHRA, and to the concrete examples of antisemitism that IHRA has listed in a special document (WDA, Working Definition of Antisemitism).
This is less wise.
IHRA stands for International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance, and refers to the alliance of states that was formed on the initiative of Sweden (by then prime minister Göran Persson) more than twenty years ago and that has among its eleven examples of what should be classified as antisemitism seven examples that concern criticism of and representations of the State of Israel - several of which are deeply problematic since they have been used to label as antisemitic even seemingly legitimate criticism of the State of Israel. For example, former Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has labelled the International Criminal Court, ICC, as antisemitic for asserting its jurisdiction in Israeli-occupied territories. Israel's US Ambassador Gilad Erdan has labelled the UN refugee agency in Palestine, UNRWA, as an "antisemitic agency" for "incitement against Israel". The international protest movement for boycott and sanctions against Israel, BDS, has been labelled antisemitic by the US and Israeli governments, using the IHRA's definition. Authorities and organizations accused of antisemitism on similar grounds include the Swedish development agency SIDA and the Swedish aid organization Diakonia. The Simon Wiesenthal Centre in Los Angeles, which had played an advisory role in the drafting of the IHRA working definition, branded the whole of the EU as antisemitic a few years ago for requiring special labelling of products from occupied territory. Jewish organizations and individuals critical of Israeli policy have also been labelled antisemitic, with reference to the IHRA.
In short, the definition of antisemitism that the Swedish government has committed itself to has contributed to the ongoing and dangerous trivialization and politicization of the fight against antisemitism in order to discredit and disarm even those criticisms of the State of Israel that must be considered fully legitimate.
For example, the criticism of Israel for being a racist state (IHRA example seven of what can constitute antisemitism), which is a criticism that must legitimately be allowed to direct at a state that discriminates against people on the basis of ethnicity and that has established on occupied land a system of ethnic separation whereby one ethnic group is allowed to oppress another.
What should or should not be labelled as antisemitism must ultimately also be based on an assessment of context and intent, as the IHRA points out in the introduction to its working definitions, but time and again the working definitions have come to be used to label as antisemitic also such criticism of Israel where it should be obvious from the context and the intention that it is about something else. For example, in 2016, Sweden's Foreign Minister Margot Wallström claimed with some justification that the State of Israel had committed "extrajudicial killings" and was accused of having made a "typically antisemitic" statement according to the IHRA working definition.
Of course, criticism of Israel and Zionism can also be a manifestation of antisemitism, which undoubtedly is a manifestation that has grown stronger in the shadow of the Israel-Palestine conflict. However, taking context and intent into consideration, it is seldom difficult to distinguish one from the other. In cases where it may nevertheless be difficult to know which is what, the IHRA's current working definition have proved to be more harmful than helpful since it has been systematically used to blur the line between legitimate criticism of Israel and Zionism and antisemitism disguised as “anti-Zionism”.
This is the problematic background to the public declaration that was signed last spring by more than three hundred leading academics in the relevant fields of study and a few independent writers, including myself, The Jerusalem Declaration on Antisemitism, with the aim of making the line more distinct. Among other things, by giving examples of the kind of criticism of Israel that must be allowed without the risk of being labelled antisemitic. It was hoped that at least some of the more than thirty governments that had endorsed the IHRA definition would recognize the problem it posed, both for the fight against antisemitism and for the debate on the future of Israel-Palestine, and endeavor to rework the IHRA working definition in line with the concrete proposals put forward in the Jerusalem Declaration.
Since then, the politicization of the fight against antisemitism seems only to have escalated, and the fight against antisemitism has only further been compromised and undermined. It would therefore have been of great significance if the Swedish Prime Minister, as host of the meeting in Malmö, had also put on its agenda an open discussion of the problems that the current definition has created.
A reason still to do so could be the statement this week from the group behind the Jerusalem Declaration, addressed directly to the assembled heads of state and government in Malmö, urging them to "reject and counter the escalating political instrumentalization of the fight against antisemitism".
As a signatory to this statement too, I cannot but agree.